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AUTONOMY FEMINISM: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST 
CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY INTERVENTIONS IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
LEIGH GOODMARK*
ABSTRACT
 In the 1970s and 80s, feminists led the way in crafting and advocating for 
laws and policies to address domestic violence in the United States—and 
those feminists got it wrong. Desperate to find some way to force police to 
treat assaults against spouses as they would strangers, the battered women’s 
movement seized on the idea of mandatory arrest—relieving police of discre-
tion and requiring them to make arrests whenever probable cause existed. 
But mandatory arrest also removed discretion from the women that the policy 
purported to serve—a trend that has come to characterize domestic violence 
law and policy. Later policy choices, like no-drop prosecution and bans on 
mediating in domestic violence cases, are similarly marked by their denial of 
decisionmaking to women who have been battered. Domestic violence law and 
policy prioritizes the goals of policymakers and battered women’s advocates—
safety and batterer accountability—over the goals of individual women look-
ing for a way to address the violence in their relationships. The shift of deci-
sionmaking authority has profoundly negative implications for the autonomy 
of women who have been battered and reflects the influence of dominance fe-
minism on the battered women’s movement. This Article argues that the time 
has come to shift the lens through which we view domestic violence law and 
policy from dominance feminism to anti-essentialist feminism, allowing us to 
see how problematic mandatory policies are and helping us to craft domestic 
violence law and policy that honors the goals and priorities of women who 
have been battered.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 June 10, 1983. Charles Thurman hands police officers a knife 
dripping with his wife’s blood.1 Then, as the officers look on, he kicks 
her in the head—and he is still not arrested.2 After months of phone 
calls and reports to police warning of Charles Thurman’s violence 
and repeated threats against his wife, and after a criminal conviction 
and a civil order both required Thurman to stay away from his wife, 
Charles Thurman was still able to stab his wife multiple times in the 
chest, neck, and throat, drop their son on top of her while she bled, 
and kick her repeatedly in the head.3 Thurman’s vicious attack on his 
wife was facilitated by the Torrington, Connecticut police depart-
ment’s unwillingness to respond to numerous requests for assistance 
for Tracey Thurman and her son, Charles Jr.—inaction that contin-
ued after the stabbing. Charles Thurman was not arrested, in fact, 
until he again approached his wife while she was lying on a stretch-
er, waiting to be taken for medical treatment.4
 Tracey Thurman and her son sued the Torrington Police Depart-
ment for its failure to intervene on their behalf and received $2.3 mil-
lion in damages.5 The landmark suit not only provided Tracey and 
Charles Jr. with some small measure of compensation for their suf-
fering (Tracey Thurman remains partially paralyzed and permanent-
ly scarred from that attack)6 but, in conjunction with the settlement 
of lawsuits filed in Oakland, California, and New York City protest-
ing the lack of police response to domestic violence calls,7 began a pol-
icy revolution.   
 This revolution was designed to ensure that police could no longer 
ignore the pleas of women who had been battered8 simply because 
                                                                                                                    
 1. James B. Halsted, Domestic Violence: Its Legal Definitions, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 143, 158 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl 
G. Buzawa eds., 1992). 
 2. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Conn. 1984). 
 3. Id. at 1524-26. 
 4. Id. at 1526. 
 5. Anne Sparks, Feminists Negotiate the Executive Branch: The Policing of Male Vi-
olence, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 35, 42
(Cynthia R. Daniels et al. eds., 1997). 
 6. Id.
 7. Id. at 41. 
 8. A woman who has been battered is not necessarily a victim, a survivor, or a bat-
tered woman, though she may be any or all of these at various times. These terms—victim, 
survivor, battered woman—have all been used to describe the women who are the subject 
of this Article, and all are limited. Victim conjures up visions of a stereotype, a passive, 
meek, cowering woman consistent with the early domestic violence literature. Survivor, a 
term intended to cast off that stereotype and instead portray women as active agents 
struggling against their oppressors to ensure their own survival, is similarly limited; not 
all women do, in fact, survive domestic violence, and not all women take action on their 
own behalf (however inclusive that term might be intended to be). The term battered wom-
an is problematic because it reduces the woman to her experience of violence. A woman so 
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their assailants were their husbands. Throughout the country, either 
legislatures imposed or police departments implemented policies re-
quiring arrests in domestic violence cases whenever police had prob-
able cause to do so, ending the era of unfettered police discretion in 
determining whether individual incidents of domestic violence should 
be classified as crimes. Although Oregon passed the first such law in 
1977,9 few jurisdictions followed suit prior to 1983. After Thurman
demonstrated the potential for crippling judgments based on police 
inaction, other jurisdictions quickly imposed such policies on law en-
forcement.10 No longer were police officers permitted to advise ab-
usive men to take a walk around the block, allowing them to return 
to torment their victims whenever they pleased. Instead, these at-
tacks on their wives would be treated as seriously as if they had as-
saulted strangers. Advocates for women who had been battered 
hailed these policies, known as “mandatory arrest” laws, as a victory 
for every woman who had begged for police protection from her ab-
user to no avail.  
 Mandatory arrest policies were attractive because they deprived 
individual officers of the discretion to decide whether or not to treat a 
batterer’s violence as a crime.11 But police officers were not the only 
ones to lose some measure of control with the inception of mandatory 
arrests. In a mandatory arrest regime, no party to the incident—
abuser, officer, or victim—has the ability to preempt the involvement 
of the criminal system once the officer decides that he has probable 
cause to make an arrest. No longer could women who had been bat-
tered ask that their abusers not be taken into custody, regardless of 
                                                                                                                    
described can be understood only within the context of the violence in her relationship; she 
has no existence independent of that one facet of her life. All of these terms reflect the 
same type of reductionism that plagues so much of domestic violence law and policy; they 
assume that all women are the same, that they all experience violence in the same way, 
and that the violence defines them entirely and in so doing shapes what their responses to 
that violence should be. BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING
BLACK 87-88 (1989). Using the term “women who have been battered,” by contrast, is in-
tended to call attention to the circumstances that they have faced without describing these 
women solely as a product of those circumstances, defining the action rather than the 
woman herself. This construction is intended to provide the freedom within which to see 
women who have been battered as individuals, with different values, capacities, goals, and 
visions for their future and to suggest principles for policymaking consistent with this con-
ception. This Article will refer to the “battered women’s movement,” however, in part be-
cause the movement self-identifies using that term, and in part because the use of that 
term highlights some of the problems within the movement that the Article seeks to ad-
dress. Moreover, the language in quotations referring to “battered women” has not 
been changed. 
 9. Id. at 42. 
 10. Halsted, supra note 1, at 158. 
 11. Eve S. Buzawa, Thomas L. Austin, James Bannon & James Jackson, Role of Vic-
tim Preference in Determining Police Response to Victims of Domestic Violence, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 255, 267 (Eve S. Buza-
wa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992). 
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the reason for the request.12 A call to the police would now trigger a 
series of events leading directly to the arrest of the batterer, irrespec-
tive of whether his victim saw that as a desirable outcome. Mandato-
ry arrest brought greater protection for many women, but at a sizable 
cost—the freedom of individual women to decide whether they 
wanted to be involved in the criminal justice system at all.  
  Mandatory arrest is not the only domestic violence policy that 
gave protection to women who had been abused with one hand, but 
took their freedom to choose with the other. Both the criminal and 
civil laws that address domestic violence enforce policies that purport 
to protect women by removing not only the system’s ability to choose 
to protect, but also the woman’s ability to decline the state’s protec-
tion or intervention. The autonomy of women who have been battered 
is the price of these policies. This Article asks whether that has been 
too high a price to pay. 
 The answer to that question depends, in part, on the goals of the 
legal intervention. In her article Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, Barbara 
Hart, one of the founders of the legal arm of the battered women’s 
movement, set out six goals by which legal system interventions 
should be measured. First and foremost, she argues, is safety for 
women who have been battered and their children.13 Safety is fol-
lowed by stopping the violence, holding perpetrators accountable, di-
vesting perpetrators of control, restoring women who have been bat-
tered, and enhancing agency in women who have been battered.14
Making safety the primary goal of legal interventions is intuitively 
appealing and explains policies like mandatory arrest. But the goals 
of advocates, policymakers, and system actors might differ from those 
of women who have been battered. The problem with policies like 
mandatory arrest is that they reify two goals—safety and perpetrator 
accountability—and marginalize autonomy, serving women who 
share the goals of the system but disenfranchising those with diver-
gent goals. 
 The prioritization of safety and accountability over autonomy is 
consistent with the school of feminist thought that has colored a 
great deal of domestic violence theory and policymaking—dominance 
feminism. Dominance feminism focuses on women’s subordinated 
and victimized status and argues that the legal system can best serve 
those victims of violence by enforcing policies that ensure safety, re-
                                                                                                                    
 12. Id. (arguing that a consequence of mandatory arrest is the removal of victim dis-
cretion). 
 13. Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207, 
207 (1997) (arguing that “[e]very intervention should be measured against the yardstick of 
safety”). 
 14. Id. at 207-09. 
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gardless of what an individual woman’s preference might be.15 What 
dominance feminism ignores, however, is both the diversity of women 
who have been battered and the choices available to those women, 
opting instead for a narrow version of “victim” that suggests the in-
ability to act rationally on one’s own behalf and justifies mandatory 
policies. The emergence of anti-essentialism as a powerful critique of 
the dominance feminists’ tendency to group all women—particularly 
all women who have been battered—within the “victim” category 
provides a different context for examining mandatory policies. Anti-
essentialism requires us to delve into the complexities of the lives of 
individual women who have been battered, rather than considering 
women who have been battered collectively. Changing the lens in this 
way makes it apparent that mandatory policies are deeply problematic 
because they deprive individual women of the self-determination and 
self-direction that are essential for autonomy and empowerment. 
 This Article will begin by considering the arguments supporting 
mandatory policies in cases involving domestic violence in the crimi-
nal and civil legal systems. The focus in the criminal system will be 
on mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution;16 on the civil side, this 
Article explores bans on mediating family law cases involving domes-
tic violence. The Article will then define autonomy and explore 
whether women who have been battered are capable of exercising au-
tonomy. It will explicitly link the concepts of autonomy and empo-
werment—central goals of the battered women’s movement. Finally, 
the Article will argue that mandatory policies are disempowering 
for women who have been battered and, by employing anti-
essentialist feminist theory, urge that policymakers and advocates 
for women who have been battered oppose policies that undermine 
women’s autonomy. 
II.   MANDATORY POLICIES IN THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LEGAL
SYSTEMS
A. Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Prosecution 
 In the criminal system, the best examples of policy initiatives that 
deprive women who have been battered of meaningful choices are 
mandatory arrest laws and “no-drop” prosecution policies. As briefly 
                                                                                                                    
 15. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and 
the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 250 (2005). 
 16. A number of states have also passed laws requiring the imposition of an order for-
bidding contact with the victim in a pending criminal case, often without providing an op-
portunity for the victim to express a position. See Nichole Miras Mordini, Mandatory State 
Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety 
and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 322 (2004). Those types of laws have problems simi-
lar to the ones considered in this Article but will not be discussed in detail here. 
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discussed above, mandatory arrest policies deprive individual officers 
of discretion in deciding whether to arrest a perpetrator for domestic 
violence. Instead, mandatory arrest laws require the officer to make 
an arrest whenever the officer has probable cause to believe that an 
act of domestic violence has been committed.17 Mandatory arrest laws 
were thought to solve the “Charles Thurman” problem—the perpetra-
tor who gets warning after warning from police but is never arrested, 
and who, as a result, feels secure in his ability to continue to harass, 
threaten, and abuse his partner free from state sanction. Frustrated 
with years of police inaction in the face of severe violence,18 advocates 
for women who had been battered saw police discretion as a crucial 
weakness in the criminal justice system, particularly because police 
were trained to use that discretion to avoid arrest whenever possi-
ble.19 Remove the discretion, the thinking went, and domestic vi-
olence would be treated just as seriously as any other crime. Moreo-
ver, mandatory arrest laws would prevent police from citing discre-
tion when choosing to credit the stories of abusers who said that their 
wives were simply overwrought, when ordering women who had been 
battered to leave their own homes, or when blaming the victim for 
provoking the attack.20
 Mandatory arrest laws were thought to serve as a deterrent to in-
dividual abusers, sending the message that domestic violence was 
criminal activity warranting the intervention of the justice system.21
No longer would men be able to beat their wives with impunity; they 
would now have to consider whether the beating was worth the con-
sequences they could face. These laws would give women who had 
been battered a respite from the abuse without requiring them to af-
firm that they wanted to pursue charges, eliminating the potential 
for pressure and coercion by abusers regarding the decision about 
whether to arrest.22
                                                                                                                    
 17. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 63 (1992). 
 18. See Halsted, supra note 1, at 155. But see Marvin Zalman, The Courts’ Response to 
Police Intervention in Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE 79, 85 (Eve S. Buzawa and Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (arguing that 
research does not support the idea that the police intervene less aggressively in cases in-
volving intimate partners). 
 19. Zorza, supra note 17, at 47-49 (citing to police training manuals from Oakland, 
California, and Michigan that discouraged officers from making arrests in cases involving 
domestic violence); see also SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS
AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 158-59 (1982) (quoting James 
Bannon, Commander of the Detroit Police Department). 
 20.  Zorza, supra note 17, at 50. 
 21. Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitu-
tion Help Them When the Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 808 (1986). 
 22. Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable Differences: Battered Women, 
Police, and the Law, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 96, 115 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 
1993); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domes-
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 On a societal level, proponents believed mandatory arrest laws 
would remove domestic violence from the privacy of the home and 
subject it to the harsh light of community scrutiny.23 Before the bat-
tered women’s movement began to publicly characterize attacks on 
married women as criminal assaults, abuse of one’s wife was widely 
viewed as a husband’s prerogative.24 State authorities were inclined 
to ignore such acts as beyond the province of the state, regardless of 
the injury inflicted on the victim or her pleas for assistance.25 As law 
professor Elizabeth Schneider writes of that time, “Privacy says that 
violence against women is immune from sanction, that it is permit-
ted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of American family life. 
Privacy says that what goes on in the violent relationship should not 
be the subject of state or community intervention.”26 Advocates for 
women who had been battered fought to expose the violence that oc-
curred in private and to ensure that intimate partner violence was 
treated and penalized just as violence between strangers would have 
been. The shift from private to public resolution of domestic violence 
reflected the belief that women who had been battered wanted do-
mestic violence to be brought into the public sphere and that they 
would welcome state intervention and protection.27 Mandatory arrest 
laws were an important step in that direction. Confronted with the 
costly results of unfettered police discretion—the successful lawsuits 
in Connecticut, California, and New York—convincing state legisla-
tures to pass such laws was easy compared with earlier legislative in-
itiatives on behalf of women who had been battered.28
 Historically, police officers were unable to make arrests without 
warrants in misdemeanor cases unless they personally witnessed the 
                                                                                                                    
tic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (2004). Women who have been battered 
seem to be of two minds about these laws. While many seem to support the concept of 
mandatory arrest laws (and no-drop prosecution policies) in theory, fewer believe that 
those laws would actually improve their own situations. Many believe that such laws 
would deter women (including themselves) from reporting violence. Alisa Smith, It’s My 
Decision, Isn’t It? A Research Note on Battered Women’s Perceptions of Mandatory Interven-
tion Laws, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1384, 1384 (2000); see also Ferraro & Pope, supra, 
at 119 (citing a study showing that women were evenly split on whether police interven-
tions were helpful).  
 23. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 989 (1991). 
 24. Some have argued that violence against women was not only tolerated, but pro-
moted by law and public policy. See Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terror-
ism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF 
DOMESTIC ABUSE 11, 21-22 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
 25. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
 26. Schneider, supra note 23, at 984-85.  
 27. Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the 
Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 281
(1997). 
 28. Halsted, supra note 1, at 156; see also Zorza, supra note 17, at 60. 
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assaults.29 The first statutory changes won by the battered women’s 
movement eased these restrictions, allowing officers to arrest when-
ever they had probable cause to believe that an act of domestic vi-
olence had occurred.30 But even after legislative revisions freed police 
to make warrantless arrests in misdemeanor cases, arrest rates re-
mained low, and arrests for domestic violence continued to be rare.31
In 1984, however, attitudes among law enforcement began to change 
after the United States Department of Justice released the Attorney 
General’s Task Force on Family Violence report, which recommended 
a strong criminal justice response to domestic violence and touted 
preferred arrest policies32—the beginning of the Department of Jus-
tice’s commitment to building a nationwide criminal justice infra-
structure to hold perpetrators of domestic violence accountable for 
their actions.  
 Early efforts to enact mandatory arrest laws were also bolstered 
by research suggesting that arrest was linked to lowered rates of re-
cidivism among perpetrators of domestic violence. In 1981 and 1982, 
research in Minneapolis suggested that the arrest of domestic vi-
olence suspects deterred them from future violent behavior against 
their partners.33 Lawrence Sherman, one of the authors of that study, 
later wrote, “Although the authors cautioned against passage of 
mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence until further research 
could be conducted, by 1991 the results contributed to the passage of 
such laws in 15 states.”34
 Subsequent research in six additional cities would validate Sher-
man’s words of caution. While arrest proved to deter future violence 
in some locations, in others there was no deterrent effect. Even 
worse, some evidence indicated that arrest contributed to increases 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Halsted, supra note 1, at 156 (explaining that prior to the 1970s, all but fourteen 
states required the officer to witness a misdemeanor before making a warrantless arrest); 
Fedders, supra note 27, at 288. 
 30. Fedders, supra note 27, at 288.
 31. Halsted, supra note 1, at 156. In fact, the American Bar Association recommended 
that police not bring domestic violence cases to court in order to assist “harried and over-
worked judges.” Jaffe et al., The Impact of Police Laying Charges, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 62, 69 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993). 
 32. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence, September 3, 1984, at 24-25. 
 33. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest 
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 261, 270 (1984). 
 34. Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal 
and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 680, 680 (1992) (in-
ternal citations omitted). Marvin Zalman suggests, however, that the authors were not 
quite as circumspect as this quote would suggest. In fact, he contends, one of the authors 
sent the results of the study to the media and the Police Foundation, whose dissemination 
of their findings generated significant enthusiasm for mandatory arrest policies. Zalman, 
supra note 18, at 84.
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in future violence.35 Sherman and his colleagues hypothesized that 
arrest was a more effective deterrent for some offenders than others, 
particularly those who had a greater “stake in conformity,” or be-
lieved that they had a great deal to lose by acting in a manner consi-
dered deviant or out of the norm.36 Sherman’s studies found that 
those who were married and employed had a greater stake in con-
formity and therefore were more likely to be deterred by arrest.37
Race also factored into the deterrent effect of arrest. In cities with 
large African American populations, arrest was positively correlated 
with future violence, suggesting that arrest policies endangered Afri-
can American women.38 Nonetheless, Sherman’s early work was cited 
as justification for continuing to implement mandatory arrest policies 
regardless of the demographics of the jurisdiction.39
 Mandatory arrest laws got a further boost from the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994. This Act required states to certify that 
they had adopted either pro- or mandatory arrest policies in order to 
be eligible for federal funding under the Grants To Encourage Ar-
rests program40—a program that provided $120 million over three 
years to state and local police departments.41 Eager to ensure that 
                                                                                                                    
 35. Sherman et al., supra note 34, at 680 (citing studies in Omaha, Charlotte, Mil-
waukee, Colorado Springs, and Dade County, Florida); see also Arnold Binder & James 
Meeker, Arrest as a Method to Control Spouse Abuse, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE 
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 129, 130 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 
1992) ( “[W]e simply do not know whether arrest in response to cases of minor (misdemea-
nor) wife abuse is more or less effective in reducing recidivism than other available, and 
less harsh, methods. But we do know that grave doubts about its efficacy have been raised 
. . . . We certainly do not know the array of consequences, some possibly quite negative, of 
spousal arrest on, first, relationships and general contentment in the home and, second, 
the efficient operation of the criminal justice system. Yet, the approach of arrest in calls 
involving minor spousal abuse has been adopted as expected operating procedure in police 
departments throughout the country.”). 
 36. Sherman et al., supra note 34, at 687-88. 
 37. Id. at 686. 
 38. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND 
DILEMMAS 3 (1992). 
 39. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of 
Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 193-94 (1994). 
This rush to embrace mandatory arrest was problematic, argues Marvin Zalman.  
[W]hether the policy is wise or not, the pell-mell manner in which it was 
adopted indicates that conclusions were being made by lawyers, police chiefs, 
legislators, and policy advocates about a scientific finding (deterrence) based 
more upon a desired outcome than on a careful analysis of the Minneapolis 
Domestic Violence Experiment. This raises serious questions about the rela-
tionship between social knowledge, research findings, and legal action.  
Zalman, supra note 18, at 106.
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1) (West 2008); see also Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against 
Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Femin-
ist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463, 503-04 (1996). 
 41. Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: 
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 803 n. 5 (2001). 
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they would be able to access this important funding, states that had 
not already adopted such laws quickly did so. Today, every state has 
some form of pro-arrest policy and, as of 2004, at least twenty states 
and the District of Columbia mandated arrest in cases involving do-
mestic violence.42
 Once advocates had convinced states to enact mandatory arrest 
laws, they turned to the next obstacle in ensuring batterer accounta-
bility using the criminal system: prosecutors. Just as police officers 
historically had used their discretion to refuse to arrest perpetrators 
of domestic violence, prosecutors had also routinely chosen not to 
pursue cases against the few perpetrators of violence who police had 
actually arrested.43 Ironically, prosecutors’ failure to pursue cases in-
volving domestic violence has been cited as yet another reason police 
declined to make arrests.44
 Scholars have posited a number of reasons for the low rate of 
prosecution in domestic violence cases: the lack of evidence, the pa-
triarchal views of prosecutors, skepticism about the seriousness of 
the crimes involved, and prosecutors’ perceptions that judges were 
not interested in entertaining such cases.45 The justification most 
frequently offered by prosecutors for their reluctance to pursue do-
mestic violence cases was their inability to rely on their star wit-
nesses—the wives and girlfriends of the men they were prosecuting.46
The unwillingness of victims to testify to the abuse they had suffered 
deprived prosecutors of their best, and often their only, witnesses and 
hamstrung prosecutions in which the testimony of the involved par-
ties was the only available evidence.  
 The failure of women who had been battered to participate in 
prosecutions was widely attributed to the victims’ fear of repercus-
sions at the hands of their abusers,47 a credible fear given that, even 
after successful prosecution, sentences for domestic violence offenses 
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were ridiculously light and jail time was rarely imposed in misde-
meanor cases.48 Prosecutors began to look for ways to ensure that 
cases could be brought successfully even if victims chose not to par-
ticipate in the process—a method that has come to be known as vic-
timless prosecution. 
 The success of victimless prosecution hinges on the willingness of 
police officers to respond to cases involving domestic violence diffe-
rently and more thoroughly than they would ordinary assault cases. 
Police officers were trained to carefully investigate crime scenes, 
make detailed reports, and collect evidence that would allow prosecu-
tors to pursue cases even when the victims were unwilling to testi-
fy—much as police would investigate homicide cases.49 Prosecutors 
relied on physical evidence, photographs of both the victim and the 
perpetrator (to show his demeanor at the time of arrest and any inju-
ries, defensive or otherwise), recordings of 9-1-1 tapes, statements 
made to police, medical records, and other witness statements to se-
cure convictions in cases that would have been impossible to success-
fully prosecute without such careful attention to gathering evidence.50
 Victimless prosecution allowed prosecutors to circumvent the 
wishes of the victim by replacing her testimony, which had previous-
ly been viewed as essential, with other evidence sufficient to per-
suade a finder of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged 
crime had actually been committed. Victimless prosecution also 
enabled prosecutors to undermine the testimony of victims who ap-
peared on behalf of their partners, impeaching them with prior in-
consistent statements to police, or confronting them with photo-
graphs of injuries and their own words on 9-1-1 tapes.51
 Despite the implementation of these increasingly sophisticated 
methods of preparing domestic violence cases, prosecutorial reluc-
tance to bring domestic violence cases and victim unwillingness to 
testify continued to hamper successful prosecutions. The adoption of 
no-drop prosecution was meant to address both of these issues. No-
drop means exactly what it says—prosecutors would not dismiss 
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criminal charges in otherwise winnable cases simply because the vic-
tim was not interested in, or was even adamantly opposed to, pur-
suing the case.52
 Advocates of no-drop prosecution strategies offer three justifica-
tions for the policies. First, they argue that no-drop prosecution in 
domestic violence cases is good for society in that the purpose of the 
criminal system is not to bend to the wishes of individual victims, but 
rather to punish offenders and to deter others from committing simi-
lar crimes.53 The role of the prosecutor in the American criminal sys-
tem is to reinforce the state’s conception of the boundaries of accept-
able behavior by ensuring compliance with the laws that define and 
regulate what individuals are and are not permitted to do.54 The fail-
ure to prosecute domestic violence cases, whether attributable to pro-
secutorial diffidence or victim unwillingness, sends the message that 
violence against one’s intimate partner is acceptable, in direct con-
travention of the criminal laws.55 Consistent enforcement of the law 
is essential in ensuring respect for that law.56 Allowing intimate 
partners to continue to flout those laws without fear of repercussion 
enabled perpetrators of domestic violence to believe that the laws 
against abusing one’s intimate partner could be taken as seriously as 
most individuals take speed laws on major highways—which is to 
say, not seriously at all. 
 The second justification proffered for no-drop prosecution is victim 
safety. Prosecuting those who commit domestic violence increases 
safety both for the individual victim by removing the immediate 
threat to her, and for future victims of the same perpetrator.57 The 
victim’s inability to thwart the process is a particularly important 
guarantor of her safety. Because the victim no longer has the ability 
to stop the prosecutor from bringing the case to court, her abuser has 
no motivation to pressure her to do so.58 Shifting the burden of decid-
ing whether to prosecute the abuser from the victim to the prosecutor 
was thought to significantly safeguard the victim from further coer-
cion and violence.  
 The final justification for no-drop prosecution policies was, ironi-
cally, victim empowerment. Women who had been battered, the ar-
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gument went, would derive strength and validation from the expe-
rience of participating in the prosecution.59 This argument assumed 
successful prosecution of the case and positive treatment of the vic-
tim throughout the process. 
 One important distinction in the realm of prosecution policy is be-
tween “hard” and “soft” no-drop policies. In “soft” no-drop jurisdic-
tions, victim testimony is not compelled; instead, prosecutors work 
with women who have been battered to help them feel comfortable 
with the system and offer them resources and support that will make 
compliance with the prosecutor’s requests to assist in the prosecution 
possible.60 If the woman who has been battered is ultimately unwil-
ling, unable, or uninterested in assisting prosecutors, she will not be 
forced to do so (although the services and support the woman may be 
relying on may no longer be available if she chooses not to cooperate 
with prosecutors).61
 “Hard” no-drop policies, in contrast, are the purest form of these 
policies—prosecutors pursue their cases regardless of the victim’s 
wishes so long as sufficient evidence to prosecute exists.62 In a hard 
no-drop jurisdiction, when a victim is unwilling to appear voluntarily, 
prosecutors might subpoena her to testify or, in the most extreme 
cases, issue a warrant for her arrest and/or have her incarcerated in 
order to compel her testimony.63 Law professor Cheryl Hanna, a for-
mer prosecutor, explains the necessity for such actions: “No-drop pol-
icies that do not compel victim cooperation lack credibility.”64 If both 
the perpetrator and victim are aware that the prosecutor will not fol-
low through on the threat to force the victim’s compliance, there is 
little incentive for the perpetrator to refrain from pressuring the vic-
tim to withdraw her support for prosecution65 and even less for the 
reluctant victim to comply voluntarily.  
 At their core, these policies reflect a struggle over who will control 
the woman who has been battered—if the state does not exercise its 
control over her by compelling her testimony, the batterer will, by 
preventing her from testifying. Hard no-drop policies express the 
state’s belief that it has a superior right to intervene on behalf of the 
woman who has been battered in service of both the woman’s needs 
and the state’s objectives. Using Barbara Hart’s hierarchy of the 
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goals of legal interventions in domestic violence cases, hard no-drop 
policies clearly prioritize safety over all other aims, including foster-
ing the agency of the woman who has been battered.  
B. (Not) Mediating Family Law Matters 
 As alternative dispute resolution grows more popular in the legal 
system, ever-increasing numbers of civil family law matters have 
been deemed appropriate for mediation. In some jurisdictions, a liti-
gant cannot have a claim for divorce or custody heard without first 
engaging in mediation.66 Often described as cheaper, easier, and less 
formal than litigation, mediation is thought to give litigants greater 
control over the terms of the agreements they reach, encourage coop-
eration between the parties, and increase litigants’ satisfaction with 
the legal process.67 From the outset of the mediation explosion, how-
ever, commentators and advocates for women who have been bat-
tered have been almost universally opposed to employing mediation 
to resolve cases involving domestic violence.68 Professor Tara Lea 
Muhlhauser’s position is representative: “Mediation is unequivocally 
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wrong when the dynamics of violence exist in a relationship.”69 Or, as 
advocates Allen M. Bailey and Carmen Kay Denny ask, “[H]ow is a 
client, whose spouse shoved the barrel of a .44 magnum revolver into 
her or his ear and threatened to kill, supposed to benefit from a 
‘heart to heart’ talk with the battering partner and negotiate custody 
of their children or anything else?”70 Theoretical and practical con-
cerns about the appropriateness of mediating such cases seem to 
drive this opposition. 
 Some opponents of mediation fear that mediating cases involving 
domestic violence trivializes these matters. Because safety is the 
overriding concern for many advocates, the inability of mediation to 
stop the violence and ensure safety is a sufficient reason to avoid the 
process.71 Women should not have to negotiate for their safety;72
agreements that make the cessation of abuse contingent on some 
concession by the woman who has been battered are completely un-
acceptable for that reason.73 But even when the violence itself is not 
what is being mediated, critics contend that using alternative dispute 
resolution to address cases involving domestic violence undermines 
the seriousness with which such cases are treated.74
 Relegating these issues to mediators rather than using the time 
and resources of the court system to resolve them sends the message 
that these cases are not as important as others. Opponents of media-
tion have charged gender bias in the consignment of “women’s issues” 
like domestic violence to alternative dispute resolution.75 Critics fur-
ther contend that the development of the law in cases involving do-
mestic violence is stunted when cases are resolved through mediated 
agreements rather than adversarial proceedings, which can create 
binding precedent favorable to the women who follow.76
 Privacy is again a concern in the debate over mediating domestic 
violence cases. Given the efforts of advocates to move domestic vi-
olence from the private sphere to the public arena of the legal system, 
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it is hardly surprising that the effort to shift resolution of cases in-
volving domestic violence into a private dispute resolution system is 
unpopular. Allowing mediation of these cases “causes the re-
privatization of family law resulting in a setback to the political and 
legislative progress of the battered women’s movement.”77 Mediating 
cases involving domestic violence removes such violence from the 
public eye and makes it easier for the legal system and the public 
alike to underestimate the prevalence of violence in family relation-
ships and the toll that such violence takes on women who have been 
battered and their children.78
 Moreover, mediating cases involving domestic violence allows per-
petrators to avoid public sanction for their actions, undermining the 
goal of batterer accountability.79 This is particularly true, opponents 
have argued, because mediation is focused on the future.80 Many me-
diators discourage discussions of past abuse and fail to consider how 
that abuse could affect negotiated arrangements for interactions be-
tween the parties going forward.81 This future focus prevents women 
who have been battered from using mediation to confront their part-
ners with their actions and the consequences of their use of violence. 
This focus also precludes women who have been battered from dis-
cussing how their fears of further violence and control color their 
reactions to proposed custody and visitation plans or their concerns 
that abusers will use economic tools, like withholding alimony and 
child support, to continue to exercise control post-separation.  
 Another theoretical concern about mediating such cases is the in-
ability to reconcile the ideology and practices of mediation with the 
realities of domestic violence. Mediation is frequently described as a 
method of resolving conflicts; by contrast, advocates for women who 
have been battered are quick to explain that domestic violence is not 
about conflict, but rather control and the use of violence to maintain 
that control.82 Mediation provides the abuser with yet another oppor-
tunity to attempt to exert control over his partner—an opportunity 
that may be particularly welcome to the abuser after the parties have 
separated and his access to his victim decreased.83
 Even if it appears that particular areas of conflict between the 
parties, like child custody and marital property, are being resolved, 
the larger issue of control lurks in the shadows and may constrain 
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the ability of the woman who has been battered to confidently assert 
her positions.84 As a result, the woman may not negotiate forcefully 
and may concede too much in order to avoid angering her partner.85
Her partner, in contrast, may contest points that are truly unimpor-
tant to him simply because he can and because he knows that it 
will unnerve his former partner. Mediation is said to require 
cooperation between the parties; cooperation with someone who 
changes his demands only to demoralize the other participant is a 
practical impossibility. 86
 The scant possibility of reaching an agreement makes mediation a 
costly addition to the legal process.87 Because settlement is unlikely, 
mediation (which may require payments to a mediator and counsel) 
becomes yet another hurdle that the woman who has been battered 
must clear before getting access to the courtroom, where her concerns 
will finally be heard and her claims adjudicated.88
 Perhaps the most frequently cited justification for avoiding media-
tion in cases involving domestic violence is the power imbalance be-
tween the parties.89 One of the core principles of mediation is that the 
parties come to the table with equal power, equally able to assert 
their positions and to discuss and negotiate the terms of an agree-
ment between them.90 Some critics contend that all women are at a 
disadvantage in mediation by virtue of their unequal economic and 
social power.91 Most agree that women who have been battered are at 
a distinct disadvantage in mediation as a result of the coercion and 
violence that have characterized their relationships.92 The assump-
tion is that a woman who has been battered is simply incapable of 
equaling her batterer’s power. As Professors Karla Fischer, Neil 
Vidmar, and Rene Ellis write, “[B]y its very nature the culture of a 
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battering makes the couple unequal in subtle and pervasive ways.”93
As a result, productive mediation is said never to be possible in cases 
involving domestic violence.  
 This theoretical concern about the innate power imbalance be-
tween a woman who has been battered and her abuser is tied to a 
pragmatic concern about the mediator’s inability to redress those 
power imbalances. The mediation literature is replete with references 
to the mediator’s ability to “balance the power” between the parties, 
but descriptions of just how a mediator is able to balance power or 
how a party can be sure that the power is, in fact, balanced before  
mediation proceeds are rare.94 Power differentials in cases involving 
domestic violence are significantly different than in other kinds of re-
lationships; the mediator may be attempting to balance power be-
tween parties who have been in unequal positions for years or who 
have never been equals within the relationship.95 Professors Fischer, 
Vidmar, and Ellis note, “the notion that power which has been gross-
ly imbalanced over the course of an entire multi-year relationship 
can be shifted within a two hour mediation session minimizes the se-
riousness of the impact of the abuse on battered women.”96 A media-
tor’s assurances that he can balance the power sufficiently to ensure 
that her interests are protected in mediation may prove cold comfort 
to the woman who has been battered. Battered woman’s advocate 
Joan Zorza has argued that women who have been battered are so 
fearful and submissive that even mediators with a sophisticated un-
derstanding of domestic violence cannot bridge the power differential.97
 Few mediators, opponents argue, have the kind of specialized 
training in and experience with domestic violence that would enable 
them to identify the violence in the first instance.98 Mediators are not 
always required by law to have training in domestic violence, al-
though model standards developed for mediators in family law cases 
require such training.99 One survey of over 200 courts and mediation 
services throughout the United States indicated that 30% of the pro-
                                                                                                                    
 93. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2162. 
 94. But see Ver Steegh, supra note 67, at 186-87. 
 95. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2168-69; Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Media-
tion of Custody in the Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37 
FAM. & CONCILATION CTS. REV. 335, 344 (1999). 
 96. Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2168. 
 97. Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody: Disputes When One Parent Abuses 
the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, § V(B) (1996). 
 98. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 68, at 2169-2171. 
 99. THE SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRACTICE: MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 
FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (2000), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/ 
modelstandards.pdf (“A family mediator shall recognize a family situation involving do-
mestic abuse and take appropriate steps to shape the mediation process accordingly.”). 
2009]                          AUTONOMY FEMINISM 19 
grams do not train their staff to identify domestic violence.100 Without 
such training, some fear that mediators will not recognize the kind of 
subtle manipulation that the abuser might use to prevent his victim 
from fully participating in the mediation.101 The abuser might even 
be able to turn the mediator against the woman who has been bat-
tered, contributing to a climate in which the woman feels that she 
cannot assert herself or have her concerns heard, or causing the me-
diator to pressure her to accept an unfair agreement.102
 Although many states require that mediators screen for domestic 
violence before beginning work with the parties, that screening may 
not be occurring and, if it is, may not be effective in identifying vi-
olence in the relationship. Two recent studies examining mediation of 
family law matters in Maryland, a state that prohibits mediation in 
cases involving domestic violence, found that mediations occurred in 
a significant number of custody cases although domestic violence was 
clearly present.103
 Even when mediators screen for and identify domestic violence, 
they may not change their regular practices to account for the vi-
olence. In their review of policies and practices for mediating custody 
cases involving domestic violence, researchers Nancy Thoennes, Pe-
ter Salem, and Jessica Pearson found that 74% of mediators some-
times conducted mediations in cases involving domestic violence 
without changing their regular practice; 3% of mediators with domes-
tic violence training and 17% of mediators without training reported 
that they never changed their techniques in cases involving domestic 
violence.104 These mediators, then, are unlikely to be taking special 
measures either to ensure the safety of the woman who has been bat-
tered or to balance the power between the parties.  
 Another problematic aspect of mediating domestic violence cases 
is that the woman who has been battered must articulate her own 
goals and needs during the mediation—a task that she may simply 
be unable to accomplish when confronted with her abusive partner. 
In her study of 129 divorced women with children, social scientist 
Demie Kurz found that 30% of women were fearful during their child 
support negotiations, 38% were fearful during custody negotiations, 
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and 35% were fearful during marital property negotiations.105 These 
fears, Kurz discovered, were linked to the women’s experiences of vi-
olence during their marriages and separations and were stronger for 
women who had experienced more frequent or serious violence.106
 As a result of these fears of violence, both past and future, Kurz 
found, these women reduced the amount of their requests for child 
support and, in some cases, abandoned their cases altogether.107 Kurz 
concludes, “[T]hese data suggest that a substantial group of women 
negotiate for resources in a ‘climate of fear’ in which their fear of vi-
olence can lead them to forfeit their rights.”108 Imagine how much 
more difficult it would be for a woman to forcefully assert her rights 
while sitting in close proximity to her abuser in a process that ex-
pects her to be able to come to some agreement. And while having 
counsel present during the mediation might alleviate some of these 
concerns, in many mediations counsel are not permitted to attend, let 
alone participate.109 Even if counsel is present, these same concerns 
might prevent a woman from giving counsel either the information or 
the authority to negotiate freely on her behalf. 
 Safety concerns are another reason for discouraging mediation in 
cases involving domestic violence. Mediation may require that the 
parties share the same physical space, giving the abuser access to the 
woman that he may have been denied by separation or by court or-
der.110 Court-ordered mediation could, in fact, enable the abusive 
partner to circumvent the terms of a court order requiring him to 
stay away from his partner.111 Once granted that access, opponents 
argue, the potential for violence during the mediation itself exists, 
with few of the kinds of safeguards in place, like court security per-
sonnel and metal detectors, which protect women who have been bat-
tered when they enter courtrooms to confront their abusers.112 Media-
tion could trigger violence not just during the session itself, but af-
terwards; having expressed her desires and, by so doing, undermined 
her partner’s control, the woman who has been battered might fear 
that her abuser will retaliate against her as a way of reestablishing 
his dominance.113
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 Recall the benefits of mediation listed earlier: cheaper, easier, less 
formal, gives litigants greater control, encourages cooperation, in-
creases satisfaction. Few of these justifications for promoting media-
tion seem to operate in cases involving domestic violence, but poten-
tial dangers abound in mediating these cases. For that reason, many 
advocates have fought to ensure that women who have been battered 
can avoid mediation, and they have been remarkably successful. 
Some states require that mediators screen for domestic violence be-
fore beginning mediation.114 Many states allow women who have been 
battered to opt out of mediation if they can persuade the court or the 
mediator that there is a history of violence in the relationship or if 
there is currently a protective order in effect.115 Delaware’s law is typ-
ical: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, Fami-
ly Court mediation conferences shall be prohibited in any child 
custody or visitation proceeding in which 1 of the parties has been 
found by a court, whether in that proceeding or in some other pro-
ceeding, to have committed an act of domestic violence against the 
other party or if either party has been ordered to stay away or 
have no contact with the other party, unless a victim of domestic 
violence who is represented by counsel requests such mediation.116
Because they cannot feel confident that mediation will be a safe and 
productive process for women who have been battered, advocates 
routinely warn women away from participating in mediation, en-
couraging them to use these provisions to opt out of the process 
whenever possible. One critic of mediation has even suggested that 
states require women who have been battered to participate in ther-
apy before and while engaging in mediation with their partners.117
 In a few states, women who have been battered have no choice re-
garding mediation. Cases involving domestic violence cannot be me-
diated, regardless of the wishes of the parties involved. Maryland 
law, for example, prohibits the court from ordering mediation in cas-
es in which a party or child (or a mediation program that has 
screened the case) represents to the court that there is a genuine is-
sue of physical or sexual abuse of a party or child that 
makes mediation inappropriate for the situation.118 Illinois,119 Minne-
sota,120 Montana,121 North Dakota,122 and Pennsylvania123 also pro-
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hibit courts from sending cases involving domestic violence to media-
tion. Such laws and policies ensure that women who have been bat-
tered cannot be further harmed by the process and must instead pur-
sue their claims through the adversarial system—the ultimate pro-
tection that advocates can provide.  
III.   DEFINING AUTONOMY AND AGENCY
 These policies all seem like perfectly reasonable responses to defi-
ciencies in the legal system’s ability to respond adequately to domes-
tic violence. Before we can determine whether exchanging a woman’s 
ability to control her participation in the legal system for the man-
dated protection of that system has been a good bargain for women 
who have been battered, however, we should first consider the values 
of autonomy and agency.  
 What does autonomy mean? While that might seem a facile ques-
tion, for philosophers it is a much more complicated one than it might 
appear. Autonomy has alternately been described as a basic state of 
being and as a competence that one must develop.124 Contrast basic 
autonomy, which references individuals who are responsible, inde-
pendent, and able to speak for themselves, with ideal autonomy, 
which requires that individuals operate in a state of maximal au-
thenticity of choice, free of any self-distorting influences.125 Philoso-
phers have defined autonomy as the theoretical capacity for self-
governance, the actual condition of self-governance, the ideal of self-
governance in a state of absolute freedom, and a set of rights that 
undergird the ability to establish sovereignty over the self.126 Funda-
mentally, however, autonomy is constituted of the independence to 
deliberate and make choices free from manipulation by others and 
the capacity to make reasoned decisions about how to live one’s life.127
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As philosopher John Christman writes, “[T]he unifying idea behind 
the various uses of the notion of autonomy is that of ‘self-
government’—being or doing only what one freely, independently, 
and authentically chooses to be or do.”128
 Autonomy is at the heart of liberal political philosophy. The idea 
that individuals should be able to choose how to govern their lives 
without the state dictating those choices (either to achieve its pre-
ferred goals or to protect people from choices it believes to be anti-
thetical to their well-being) is central to the theories of Immanuel 
Kant and John Stuart Mill, whose work forms the basis of much of 
American political thought.129 Not surprisingly, then, autonomy is al-
so one of the cornerstones of the American legal system.130
 Feminists have long been conflicted about the role of autonomy in 
shaping the law.131 Some feminists have rejected the individualistic 
bent of autonomy.132 Although autonomy seems congruent with the 
feminist goal of liberation, some have instead characterized autono-
my as selfish and egotistical.133 They argue that valuing the indivi-
dualism of autonomy rejects the reality of women’s lives, which are 
often deeply intertwined with the lives of others.134 In response, femi-
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nist philosophers have developed relational theories of autonomy, 
which stress the ability to achieve autonomy within a world in which 
individuals are socially constructed and shaped by their relationships 
with others.135
 Feminist theorists have also argued that the emphasis on auton-
omy within liberal political philosophy and the law disadvantages 
women who, by virtue of their subordinated status as victims of a pa-
triarchal system, are rarely able to exercise the sort of autonomy con-
templated by philosophers.136 Philosopher Susan Wendell articulates 
this position:  
Much of what women appear to do freely is chosen in very limiting 
circumstances, where there are few choices left to us. Even where 
the circumstances present many choices, it is often the case that 
our knowledge, our ability to judge, and our desires have been so 
distorted and manipulated by social influences as to make a mock-
ery of the idea that we choose freely.137
Because women can only contemplate options and make choices with-
in a patriarchal frame, which limits and distorts the options that are 
available, their choices can never truly be free. To value autonomy 
within a political system, then, is to ensure that women can never be 
equal actors within that system. As philosopher Morwenna Griffiths 
writes, “[A]utonomy is often thought to present a problem for women 
because (1) it is a desirable quality; and (2) women don’t have it.”138
 Some feminist thinkers have attempted to incorporate the ideas 
underlying the concept of autonomy while rejecting the philosophical 
baggage that the term autonomy carries for feminists. The word has 
become so fraught, law professor Kathryn Abrams suggests, that it 
should be rejected in favor of the term agency, which captures the 
key features of autonomy—self-definition and self-direction—but re-
cognizes how social construction delimits the choices available to 
women.139 For Abrams, self-definition involves “determining how one 
conceives of oneself in terms of the goals one wants to achieve and 
the kind of person, with particular values and attributes, one consid-
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ers oneself to be.”140 Abrams describes self-direction as the ability to 
formulate goals and plans free of the undue influence of others.141
 Similarly, in her book Real Choices: Feminism, Freedom, and the 
Limits of Law, philosopher Beth Kiyoko Jamieson suggests that fe-
minists adopt “[t]he Agency Principle—that individuals have the 
right to make their own decisions about how to live their lives, that 
individuals must be assumed to be capable of making ethical deci-
sions, and that social reprobation (well-intentioned or not) must not 
inhibit the decision-making process.”142 A feminist conception of au-
tonomy should include not only the ability to make choices within 
one’s personal life, but also the ability to exercise choice within the 
larger society. Philosopher Morwenna Griffiths defines autonomy as 
having “three interconnected strands: freedom to make oneself, free-
dom to live that self without fear of the consequences, and freedom to 
participate in public decisions that affect oneself.”143
 The question of whether women can act autonomously or with 
agency within a patriarchal system is complicated significantly by 
the presence of domestic violence. Some philosophers have ques-
tioned whether women who have been battered are ever capable of 
acting autonomously.144 They argue that battering is inherently coer-
cive, creating a context that precludes women who have been bat-
tered from being able to exercise free will.145
 Others believe that, while women who have been battered are still 
capable of exercising some form of autonomy or agency, their ability 
to do so is at best compromised and the choices that they make must 
be understood as being shaped by the context of the abusive relation-
ship.146 In a coercively controlling relationship, they assume, the 
woman is not free to make her own choices or act freely on her own 
decisions because she is subject to the will of another.147 These phi-
losophers believe that the autonomy of women who have been bat-
tered is undermined because they are too focused on safety to be able 
to fully contemplate their choices.148 Law professor Ruth Jones has 
gone so far as to suggest that courts should appoint guardians for 
women who have been coercively controlled because their judgment 
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has been so impaired and their autonomy so extinguished as to rend-
er them incapable of protecting themselves or separating from their 
partners.149 Jones writes,  
Coercively controlled battered women, immobilized by violence, 
need a more aggressive state intervention than those provided by 
empowerment-based remedies. Unable to act on their own, these 
women require an intervention that permits someone else to act on 
their behalf to protect them from their abusers until they can pro-
tect themselves.150
 Concluding that the agency or autonomy of women who have been 
battered is, at best, compromised, a number of scholars have sup-
ported the use of mandatory legal interventions to protect these 
women.151 They justify these interventions by arguing that women 
who have been battered are incapable of making authentic choices to 
protect themselves—the choices they would certainly make, these 
scholars suggest, if their autonomy had not been undermined by bat-
tering.152 As philosopher Marilyn Friedman writes, “Domestic vi-
olence . . . itself profoundly undermines a woman’s autonomy. Any-
thing that succeeds in deterring an abuser’s future abusiveness pro-
motes his victim’s long-run autonomy.”153 In the short term, Fried-
man is willing to trade the immediate decisionmaking authority of 
the woman who has been battered for the increased possibility that 
she will be able to exercise agency in the long term; as a result, she 
argues, “The law should therefore do what it can to prevent men from 
abusing their intimate female partners, even if it must do so against 
the wishes of the victims and by mandating the victims’ cooperation.”154
 These arguments are based on a number of problematic assump-
tions. These thinkers tend to equate all violent relationships with the 
exercise of coercive control and, moreover, to assume that all women 
within coercively controlling relationships are so subject to the will of 
their partners that they are unable to exercise the ability to choose. 
Ruth Jones’ definition of coercive control highlights this assumption. 
Women who have been coercively controlled, according to Jones, lack 
access to resources and the ability to use them.155 What Jones ignores 
is that the resources of a woman who has been battered are not nec-
essarily external. As survivor theory posits, women who have been 
                                                                                                                    
 149. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Break-
ing the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 628 (2000). 
 150. Id.
 151. Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, 36 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCI. 651 (1993). 
 152. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 150. 
 153. Id.
 154. Id. at 151. 
 155. Jones, supra note 149, at 613. 
2009]                          AUTONOMY FEMINISM 27 
battered rely on their own knowledge of their abusers and their in-
nate abilities to survive.156 External resources might not be what a 
woman who is being battered believes she needs. The choice not to 
access resources, then, is a poor measure of whether a woman is able 
to exercise her autonomy. More importantly, Jones’ definition, which 
hinges on accessing external resources, seems to link the inability to 
choose to the inability to leave the relationship. This formulation ig-
nores the legitimate autonomous choices that some women make to 
remain with abusive partners.  
 Supporters of mandatory interventions focus primarily on the po-
tential for preventing severe physical violence; as Friedman asserts, 
“Helping to preserve someone’s very life takes obvious precedence 
over respecting her autonomy.”157 The lives of many women who have 
been battered are not always at risk, however; lethality occurs too of-
ten in intimate relationships, but it does not occur in all of them, or 
even in the majority. Further, this argument assumes assume that 
legal intervention prevents future abuse and that autonomy will not 
be of use to the victim of violence in the course of the legal interven-
tion—that somehow the development of autonomy can wait until a 
later date. While domestic violence can certainly involve coercion, 
these thinkers assume that the choice not to engage the legal system 
is always a coerced choice. Given how these mandatory policies oper-
ate to deprive a victim of choice, it is worth questioning whether a 
woman who has been battered is ever free of coercion, regardless of 
the measures she uses to address the violence she experiences. 
 Women who have been battered can exercise autonomy and/or 
agency. The exercise of autonomy does not require unfettered or en-
tirely consistent choice.158 In fact, John Christman explains, “many 
external life situations display such contradictory and confusing cha-
racteristics that one’s very survival may demand at least a partially 
conflicting set of desires and values.”159 Women who have been bat-
tered must be free to make choices that others disagree with or  
fail to understand.160 As Morwenna Griffiths writes, “Women want 
autonomy; they want to decide the course of their own lives—even 
though this may mean that they decide to continue with precisely the 
situations that others may define for them as ones in which they  
lack autonomy.”161
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 Kathryn Abrams argues that self-direction may exist even when 
others fail to see it, when women resist the institutional forces that 
conspire to limit their ability to choose.162 Abrams describes this phe-
nomenon as “resistant self-direction,” explaining that “Women who 
resist in these ways may not be seeking to transform society in any 
systematic sense, but simply to pursue their own choices and plans in 
contexts where doing so evokes serious gender-based challenge.”163
One such situation, argues Abrams, is in the context of a violent rela-
tionship. Building on the work of feminist legal scholar Martha Ma-
honey and the ideas underlying survivor theory, Abrams argues that 
the efforts women make to safeguard themselves and their children 
within their relationships constitute exercises of self-direction, of 
agency, despite the existence of outside constraints on these women’s 
ability to freely choose.164
 The arguments made by those who support mandatory interven-
tions beg the conclusion that women who have been battered can 
rarely, if ever, act autonomously, a problematic assertion given the 
primacy of autonomy in the American political and legal systems. Ac-
cepting that women who have been battered are incapable of engag-
ing in independent deliberation devalues these women as members of 
the political society and invites and justifies what some might cha-
racterize as paternalism on their behalf.165 Paternalism reflects a 
lack of respect for autonomy and for the individual as a person.166 A 
number of the policies adopted to address domestic violence—policies 
championed by many advocates for women who have been battered 
—are guided by what seems to be patently paternalistic views of 
these women as powerless, limited individuals incapable of acting on 
their own behalf.167
 A better way to characterize the spirit motivating these policy 
choices, at least on the part of advocates for women who have been 
battered, is that they exemplify maternalism. These policies come 
from a well-meaning place—the desire to protect women who have 
been battered from further intimidation and violence, from their own 
inability to invoke the legal system given their fear of retaliation 
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from their abusers, from losing their children or economic benefits in 
unfair mediations. This maternalism is born of advocates’ expe-
riences with a legal system that has too often failed to safeguard the 
rights and needs of women who have been battered and their belief 
that mandatory interventions are instrumental in ensuring that the 
system treats cases of domestic violence seriously.  
 But maternalism is no better than paternalism in that it assumes 
that women who have been battered are incapable of considering the 
full range of possibilities and deprives them of the ability to make 
choices for themselves, based on their own goals, values, beliefs, and 
understanding of their situations. Maternalism undermines the au-
tonomy of women who have been battered. Exercises of maternalism 
to justify the implementation of mandatory policies are fundamental-
ly at odds with one of the foundational goals of the battered women’s 
movement—empowerment.  
IV.   WHY EMPOWERMENT MATTERS
 If, as most scholars agree, domestic violence is characterized by a 
power imbalance between the parties,168 restoring power to women 
who have been battered should be a priority when crafting domestic 
violence law and policy.169 For that reason, empowerment has been a 
central, though not always well-defined, theme in the battered wom-
en’s movement.170 In her seminal work, Women and Male Violence: 
The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women’s Movement, social 
work professor Susan Schechter describes empowerment as “the illu-
sive word that embodies the sense of controlling one’s life and cir-
cumstances.”171 For Schechter, empowerment is 
[A] process through which women, experts about their own lives, 
learn to know their strength. “Empowerment” combines ideas 
about internalizing personal and collective power and validating 
women’s personal experiences as politically oppressive rather than 
self-caused or “crazy.” In a feminist political context, empower-
ment signifies standing together as a community just as it means 
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supportively enabling a person to take risks. Its premise is to turn 
individual defeats into victories through giving women tools to bet-
ter control their lives and joining in collective struggle.172
 Other definitions of empowerment echo the language of autonomy 
and agency. Empowerment has been described as “a process of enabl-
ing people to master their environments and achieve self-
determination.”173 The goal of empowering social work interventions, 
according to social work professor and researcher Einat Peled and 
her colleagues, should be “to allow clients control over their own lives 
and the ability to make decisions for themselves—that is, to provide 
them the conditions to balance rights and needs and thus make 
choices.”174 Empowerment is important not only in a theoretical 
sense, but also because it may have concrete positive consequences 
for women who have been battered. Researchers Lauren Bennett 
Cattaneo and Lisa A. Goodman have found that empowering court 
experiences predict long-term improvements in depression and quali-
ty of life for women who have been battered.175
 In the world of services for women who have been battered, how-
ever, empowerment is often defined by what service providers can 
give to women who have been battered—particularly, the provider’s 
ability to reinstate choice for women whose options have been re-
stricted by their partners.176 Too often, though, those choices have 
been constrained by what service providers, advocates, and policy 
makers deem acceptable alternatives for women who have been bat-
tered—particularly, separating from their abusive partners and en-
gaging the criminal justice system.177
 In “giving” the woman options, certain possibilities, like engaging 
in mediation or dropping criminal charges, may never come up for 
discussion. If those options are raised, they are presented in a man-
ner meant (consciously or unconsciously) to dissuade the woman from 
seeing them as viable alternatives. Certainly this is the case with 
mediation. While few advocates forbid women from participating in 
the process, many, if not most, describe mediation in a manner that 
makes it clear that the advocate believes the process to be at best an-
tithetical to the woman’s interests, and at worst a danger to her safe-
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ty.178 Relying on the advocate’s expertise and experience with the le-
gal system, a woman who might otherwise be interested in attempt-
ing to mediate is easily steered towards other alternatives.  
 Restricting choice is congruent with a definition of empowerment 
that calls for “giving” women choices or “letting” women choose 
among the options presented. In that context, empowerment would 
not require that the woman be permitted to generate options for her-
self or that all choices be presented, only that some choice be given 
and that the woman be free to select from what is offered. But empo-
werment must mean more than simply substituting advocates or the 
state for the abusive partner as the arbiter of choices for women who 
have been battered. Empowerment should be read as consistent with 
autonomy or agency—as self-direction, self-determination, enabling 
the woman who has been battered not only to make choices, but to 
define the options for herself, regardless of how others would eva-
luate those options. A belief in the centrality of empowerment for 
women who have been battered should prevent advocates from em-
bracing mandatory policies. 
 Empowerment is a central feminist theme and was a key concept 
in the early battered women’s movement. But as the state became 
more involved in the lives of women who had been battered, empo-
werment found itself competing with other goals, particularly victim 
safety and offender accountability.179 As one woman wrote many 
years ago,  
It has been over a decade since the battered women-mothers 
planted the seeds of the domestic violence movement. Something 
unsettling and unanticipated has occurred; a movement which be-
gan as the battered woman’s is less and less hers. Rather than 
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true empowerment for battered women, the original political ideal, 
we battered women could be swept away . . . .180
In the case of mandatory interventions like mandatory arrest, no-
drop prosecution, and mediation bans, empowerment has certainly 
taken a back seat, to the decided detriment of some women who have 
been battered. 
V.   THE LAW AS A DISEMPOWERING FORCE
 Noellee Mowatt’s experience with the legal system highlights the 
tension between mandatory interventions and autonomy and empo-
werment. Mowatt called police in Ontario in December 2007, alleging 
that her boyfriend, Christopher Harbin, punched her, grabbed her, 
and stabbed at her feet with a knife.181 When she failed to appear for 
his trial in March 2008, a warrant was issued for her arrest.182 In 
April 2008, Mowatt, nine months pregnant with Harbin’s child, was 
jailed for a week without bail until she gave testimony in his trial.183
The court was well within the law in issuing the warrant, enabling 
prosecutors to secure Mowatt’s testimony. But what did jailing Mo-
watt achieve? Harbin was acquitted in May 2008, largely because of 
questions about Mowatt’s credibility after Mowatt recanted her alle-
gations of abuse on the stand.184 Mowatt has vowed, “I’m never call-
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ing the police again—even if I’m dying, I’m not going to call them.”185
In seeking to hold Harbin accountable and protect Mowatt, the legal 
system achieved neither goal. By usurping Mowatt’s choice about 
whether to engage the criminal system to protect her, the system in-
stead drove her away, all but ensuring that Mowatt will avoid  
state intervention and any future abuse will go unpunished by the 
legal system.186
 Meredith Bell has a similar story. On July 8, 2002, police found 
Bell and her boyfriend, Adrian Spraggins, arguing in the parking lot 
of her workplace.187 Although Bell had not called the police for assis-
tance, when they arrived she described how Spraggins had threat-
ened her repeatedly, pushed her down, and forced her and her son in-
to a car with him.188 Spraggins then drove her to work; when Bell 
grabbed the keys and left the car, Spraggins chased her and threat-
ened to hit her.189 Witnesses called the police.190
 What precipitated this incident? Spraggins had been violent to-
wards Bell in the past. On July 8, 2002, Bell was scheduled to testify 
against him in another domestic violence case, and the threats 
Spraggins made that day were tied to her testimony.191 The irony, 
though, is that Bell was not testifying willingly in the matter—she 
had been subpoenaed to appear.192 Bell also did not testify willingly 
in the trial on the July 8 incident, where Spraggins was charged with 
witness intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and domestic 
violence. Approximately one month before that trial, Bell sent a letter 
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asking that the charges be dismissed, stating that “she never had any 
intention of testifying against Spraggins, that he did not intimidate 
her, and that she never wanted him to be prosecuted.”193
 At trial, Bell testified that her statement to the police, in which 
she recounted the events of July 8, was false and that she lied to po-
lice because she was angry with Spraggins.194 Bell stated that she 
loved Spraggins, that he helped her to support her child, who was not 
biologically his, and that she did not want him to get into trouble.195
The trial judge responded acidly to the testimony that prosecutors 
forced Bell to give: “So let me see if I’ve got this all straight. We’re 
here trying this case because you are a liar. Is that correct?”196
Spraggins unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on the witness in-
timidation count, arguing that the judge’s statements prejudiced  
the jury.197
 While Spraggins’ claim on appeal was not persuasive, the refusal 
of prosecutors to allow Bell to choose whether to proceed, coupled 
with the judge’s treatment of Bell on the witness stand, may have 
guaranteed that Bell will not use the system again.198 As one Colora-
do judge cautioned in a case where prosecutors attempted to prose-
cute a woman for complicity, alleging that she contacted her partner 
in violation of a criminal protective order that she did not want and 
repeatedly and unsuccessfully asked prosecutors to dismiss, “the na-
ture of the prosecution does not alter the victim’s status as a victim 
nor, through some sort of legal alchemy, permit her to be exploited by 
a bullying prosecutor rather than a bullying spouse.”199
 The battered women’s movement endorsed the policy choices that 
led to these results for Nicole Mowatt and Meredith Bell—policies 
that actively prioritize safety and accountability over autonomy for 
every woman who has been battered. Championing mandatory ar-
rest, no-drop prosecution, and mediation bans has helped to make the 
                                                                                                                    
 193. Spraggins, 2003 WL 22971050, at *2. 
 194. Id. at 2. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id.
 198. Id. In a different twist, a Massachusetts prosecutor was suspended from the prac-
tice of law for six months for lying in court to protect her boyfriend from prosecution, de-
spite expressing her unwillingness to participate at every stage of the legal proceedings. 
Fawn Balliro’s boyfriend blackened her eye and split her lip after he saw her speaking to 
another man in a bar. Balliro did not call the police, bailed her boyfriend out of jail, told 
the prosecutor she did not want to press charges, and gave inconsistent testimony during 
his trial. Charges against him were dismissed. Balliro’s suspension was a more serious pe-
nalty than the two-month suspension given to a Massachusetts lawyer convicted of as-
saulting his wife in 2002. See Kathleen Burge, Prosecutor’s Punishment Angers Abuse Vic-
tims’ Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2009, at Reg 3. 
 199. People v. Caldarella, No. 07CV174 (Dist. Ct. Colo. 2007); see also HILTON, supra 
note 180, at 4. 
2009]                          AUTONOMY FEMINISM 35 
law a disempowering force in the lives of women who have been bat-
tered.200 That choice is problematic on two levels. First, it assumes 
that these policies will actually enhance safety, despite the lack of 
evidence of their effectiveness at the time of their adoption and, at 
best, conflicting evidence today. Secondly, it assumes that all women 
who have been battered would choose safety—defined as separation 
from an abusive partner—or accountability over autonomy. 
 Debates continue to rage about the efficacy of these mandatory 
policies. While Sherman’s initial studies are still used to justify man-
datory arrest, more recent research, including Sherman’s own, paints 
a much more nuanced picture of the usefulness of arrest in domestic 
violence cases.201 Similarly, the data on the link between prosecution 
and repeat violence is equivocal.202 Although recent studies support 
the hypothesis that mandatory arrest laws increase the number of of-
fenders arrested for violence against their partners, that research 
has not established a link between higher arrest rates and safety or 
accountability.203 Moreover, the number of successful prosecutions 
has not increased in jurisdictions that implemented mandatory ar-
rest laws; in fact, fewer cases were prosecuted in mandatory arrest 
jurisdictions.204 As Professor Linda Mills argues, “At worst, the crim-
inal justice system increases violence against women. At best, it has 
little or no effect.”205
 The debate about whether mediation helps or harms women who 
have been battered is similarly inconclusive. Supporters of mediation 
claim that women find mediation empowering, that it enhances  
women’s ability to stand up for themselves, and that it is vastly pref-
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erable to litigating contested family cases.206 Litigation, they argue, 
makes angry and hostile parents more violent,207 relies on attorneys 
(when there are actually attorneys involved, which is increasingly 
rare) and judges with no training in domestic violence to protect 
women who have been battered,208 is  both financially and emotional-
ly costly,209 and undermines the self-determination of women who 
have been battered.210
 Just as proponents of mediation have urged skeptics not to com-
pare the best litigation with the worst mediation and find mediation 
wanting,211 mediation’s champions tend to juxtapose the worst litiga-
tion against the most successful mediation.212 The argument assumes 
that one of these avenues for dispute resolution must be seen as une-
quivocally better for all women who have been battered, a conclusion 
that is impossible to draw. From an autonomy perspective, what is 
essential is that women who have been battered have the opportunity 
to learn (in an unbiased manner) about all of their options and are 
given the chance to make choices as to which option better serves 
their individual needs.213
 Assume for a moment, however, that the data about such policies 
was unambiguous—that mandatory policies could be clearly and cau-
sally linked to increased offender accountability or greater safety for 
women who have been battered. Would such policies then be justi-
fied? Not if we hearken back to the original goals of the battered 
women’s movement and prioritize autonomy as we should. These pol-
icies essentialize women who have been battered by assuming that 
all women would choose state intervention if they had the unfettered 
ability to make that choice, and that the coercion these women expe-
rience prevents them from exercising the “rational” choice embodied 
in the mandatory policy.  
 The emphasis on coercion in understanding the behavior of wom-
en who have been battered is in part responsible for these assump-
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tions. But coercion—the pressure to make a particular decision—does 
not render every choice involuntary. Consider the case of Meredith 
Bell. Certainly her request that prosecutors drop the criminal case 
against her boyfriend was coerced in the sense that she was under 
pressure not to testify against him.214 But did that pressure necessar-
ily prevent her from making a rational decision not to cooperate with 
prosecutors? Such a position assumes that in the face of threats, 
women lose their abilities to consider, evaluate, and decide—that 
they lose their reason. It is just as possible that in the face of a threat 
a woman could look at the protection the system has offered in the 
past, the resources she has to draw on, and  her goals, priorities, and 
relationships, and decide that not testifying could, in fact, decrease 
the level of threat she faces and improve her life.215 The operation of a 
mandatory policy, designed and implemented not with Meredith Bell 
in mind, but based on a stereotypical victim whose choices are consis-
tent with the legal system’s goals and objectives, should not deprive 
her of that choice.216
 Mandatory policies also ignore the profound impact that race, 
class, sexual orientation, immigration status, and other identities 
may have on women’s decisions to invoke formal systems. Many 
women of color, for example, are profoundly ambivalent about involv-
ing the criminal system in their lives, given their negative past expe-
riences with police and prosecutors217 and  concerns about subjecting 
men of color to further control by the state.218 Lesbians may be reluc-
tant to engage the criminal justice system for fear of being outed219 or 
mistreated by police and prosecutors who assume that violence be-
tween women must be a “cat fight,”220 or that a “butch” lesbian must 
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always be the aggressor.221 Low income women may not be able to af-
ford the arrest and prosecution of their partners;222 the economic re-
sources their partners provide might be more important than a cessa-
tion of the battering at a particular point in time. Immigrant women, 
particularly those who are undocumented or whose partners are un-
documented, may fear that involvement in the criminal system will 
lead to deportation, depriving them of economic, emotional, extended 
family, or parenting support.223
 Some of these same women may want to use mediation to resolve 
problems precisely because they are unwilling to resort to the crimi-
nal system—a solution denied them by mandatory policies against 
mediation in cases involving domestic violence. Such decisions are far 
from irrational. They are calculated choices made based on past ex-
periences and with intimate knowledge of their partners, their re-
sources, their political views, their family concerns—in short, based 
on the lives that they seek to fashion. The state should not have the 
power to deny that choice to women who have been battered. 
 How far are advocates willing to take mandatory interventions in-
to the lives of women who have been battered in the name of safety? 
A look at laws requiring physicians to report evidence of domestic vi-
olence to law enforcement and/or other state agencies may be in-
structive. A number of states mandate that health care professionals 
report injuries resulting from criminal activity or inflicted by specific 
kinds of weapons to law enforcement. A smaller subset of these states 
requires that health care professionals report injuries resulting from 
violence by an intimate partner.224 Those laws generally require phy-
sicians and other health care professionals to inform police of injuries 
resulting from criminal acts, including domestic violence.225 The orig-
inal justification for California’s law was to ensure that all criminal 
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activity came to the attention of police;226 in 1994, domestic violence 
was specifically listed as a crime to be reported at the urging of child-
ren’s groups and law enforcement.227 Former Kentucky Attorney 
General Steven Beshear has opined that the duty under Kentucky’s 
reporting law is absolute, not alleviated by treatment, therapy, or the 
victim’s refusal to press charges or leave the home.228 If the adult who 
is the subject of the report refuses to allow state officials to enter her 
home after such a report, the court may issue a search warrant per-
mitting entry onto the premises.229
 Some reporting laws abrogate the physician/patient privilege and 
allow for the admission of statements and other information revealed 
during examination and diagnosis of the patient.230 Colorado added 
its domestic violence provision in 1995;231 the Colorado courts later 
upheld the abrogation of the physician/patient privilege, explaining 
that the legislature could abrogate the privilege when an overriding 
public policy need for the information to be made public existed. The 
Court held that such provisions struck an appropriate balance be-
tween the need to protect victims of domestic violence and the desire 
to encourage them to seek treatment free of fear or embarrass-
ment.232 New Hampshire’s reporting law provides an exception to re-
porting if the victim is over the age of eighteen and objects to the re-
lease of the information, unless she has been treated for a gunshot or 
other serious bodily injury.233
 These reporting laws seem to be logical extensions of the philoso-
phy that mandatory interventions benefit victims of violence because 
they ensure that law enforcement will have knowledge of the com-
mission of domestic violence crimes and the opportunity to ensure 
that perpetrators are held accountable for their actions. Abrogating 
the physician/patient privilege to require reporting simply prioritizes 
victim safety and offender accountability over victim privacy and au-
tonomy—the same calculation made with other mandatory policies. 
Yet advocates for victims of violence roundly condemn such laws.234
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40 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
Ariella Hyman has argued that “there is ample reason to believe that 
mandatory reporting of all injuries due to domestic violence 
represents a threat to the health and safety of survivors of domestic 
violence.”235 Hyman argues that such laws deter victims from seeking 
medical treatment, expose women who have been battered to the risk 
of retaliation by their abusers, and undermine patient autonomy. 
Hyman quoted one woman involved in a support group for women 
who had been battered as “dismayed at being ‘treated as if they were 
infants and not able to make up their own minds whether to report to 
the police.’ ”236 For these reasons, the Family Violence Prevention 
Fund, a leading voice in the movement against domestic violence, op-
poses mandatory physician reporting of domestic violence injuries.237
 Looking at such policies through the lens of autonomy, it is diffi-
cult to find any appreciable difference between physician reporting 
laws and other laws that mandate the involvement or noninvolve-
ment of the state in domestic violence matters. Yet, where there is 
general agreement that mandatory physician reporting laws are dis-
empowering, there is no such consensus about mandatory arrest 
laws. How is the taking the choice to engage the legal system from 
the hands of the victim any different when a physician makes the 
phone call to police?  
 One could argue that physician reporting laws go a step further 
than previous policies by usurping the woman’s decision about 
whether to involve law enforcement at all. A woman who has been 
battered is deprived of the choice to involve the police in the first in-
stance if her doctor is required to report; his duty negates any deci-
sion she might have made about whether to call the police during or 
after the incident.238 In jurisdictions embracing mandatory policies, 
however, the same consequences stem from a phone call made by a 
neighbor as from a phone call made by a doctor: mandatory arrest 
and victimless prosecution. While advocates have grave and war-
ranted concerns about creating disincentives for women who have 
been battered to seek medical treatment, the difference between phy-
                                                                                                                    
 235. Hyman, supra note 224, at 14. 
 236. Id. at 6, n. 5. The American Medical Association also opposes mandatory reporting 
of intimate partner abuse among adults, stating that such policies “violate basic tenets of 
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Id. at 2. 
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sician reporting laws and other mandatory interventions is negligi-
ble, particularly in terms of the impact on women’s autonomy. 
 Mandatory policies are disempowering because they deprive wom-
en who have been battered of the ability to control their use of tools 
like arrest, prosecution, and mediation. Women who have been bat-
tered use the legal system to attempt to regain control from their ab-
users.239 Researcher David Ford has described how women who have 
been battered use the threat of prosecution as a “power resource,” a 
tool that can be deployed to equalize the power imbalances within the 
relationship.240 Women call police not only because they want their 
partners arrested, but also to interrupt the battering incident or to 
show their partners that they are willing to reach out to others and 
to invoke the power of the state to stop the violence.241 Women partic-
ipate in prosecutions against their partners not only because they 
want those partners punished, but also to teach them a lesson, to se-
cure counseling for the battering partner, or to get support payments, 
for example.242 Similarly, women drop charges for a variety of reasons 
beyond intimidation by their partners: because the violence has 
stopped, he has agreed to counseling, or he has agreed to divorce.243
The instrumental use of arrest and prosecution empowers the woman 
who has been battered in the negotiation of the terms of her relation-
ship with her partner. Ford warns, however, that “criminal justice 
options are victim power resources only if she can control the manner 
in which they are brought to bear on her mate.”244
 The obvious problem with Ford’s caution is that the legal system 
and the police and prosecutors who work within that system may 
have very different objectives for arrest and prosecution. System ac-
tors often view their roles not as facilitating the woman’s instrumen-
tal use of the system, but as upholding the laws against domestic vi-
olence and societal mores reflected in those laws, regardless of, and 
sometimes despite, the wishes of individual women.245 The system is 
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simply not the woman’s to use—there are too many other actors with 
competing interests for such a practice to be possible.246
 Opponents of mediation justify their position by claiming that the 
goals of mediation cannot be achieved in cases involving domestic vi-
olence.247 But Ford’s insight is important in the mediation context as 
well. Whether the goals of mediation can be met in cases involving 
domestic violence depends on who defines those goals. If the goals are 
those generally articulated by the legal system—cheaper, less adver-
sarial, more likely to promote agreement248—opponents of mediation 
are indeed correct that the goals may be difficult to meet. But the 
goals of the woman who has been battered may be very different than 
those of the system. She might choose to use mediation as a space 
within which to express her anger at her partner—an anger which, if 
expressed during an adversarial proceeding, could alienate the judge 
and damage her case.249 She might choose to confront her partner 
with the consequences of his actions—the end of the relationship, the 
distribution of property, and the determination of custody rights. She 
might use mediation to show her partner that he no longer has the 
ability to control her.  
 Mediation could be a boon to the woman who has been battered 
regardless of whether an agreement is ever reached, notwithstanding 
that reaching an agreement is the usual measure of success for med-
iation. Rather than reinforcing a power imbalance between the par-
ties, mediation could serve as a power restorative, providing a safe 
space within which the woman who has been battered could make 
demands and have them heard and ratified by a neutral third party, 
and in so doing, recapture her power. Mediation, too, could serve as a 
                                                                                                                    
prosecutor, she was furious. She told me that she didn’t care what Mrs. Jefferson wanted 
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“power resource,” but only if the woman who has been battered has 
the ability to control the terms upon which it is going to be used. 
 Is it realistic to believe that women who have been battered will 
be able to control these systems? We will never know if women do not 
have the ability to make nonconforming choices. A guiding principle 
for domestic violence law and policy that seeks to honor the autono-
my of women who have been battered must be to enact only policies 
that women can control. If we truly value the empowerment of wom-
en who have been battered, we should not advocate for policies that 
operate upon women, rather than at their behest—policies that de-
prive them of self-determination and of choice.  
VI.   FROM DOMINANCE TO ANTI-ESSENTIALIST FEMINISM
 Mandatory policies reflect the influence of dominance feminism, a 
strand of feminism prevalent in the 1980s and 90s, the same time 
that domestic violence law and policy was being created and imple-
mented. Dominance feminists, led by Catherine MacKinnon, con-
tended that male domination of women in the sexual sphere was the 
primary vehicle for the continued subordination of women.250 MacK-
innon argued that “our male-dominated society, aided by male-
dominated laws, had constructed women as sexual objects for the use 
of men.”251 Using this theory, dominance feminists cast the unwil-
lingness of the law to confront issues of sexual harassment and rape 
as the manifestation of male assertions of dominion over the sexuali-
ty of women.252 Most notoriously, MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin 
used dominance feminist theory to argue that pornography should be 
outlawed, contending that pornography was the eroticization of male 
domination and therefore a key contributor to women’s subordination 
within society.253
 Mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecution, and policies banning me-
diation are consistent with a dominance feminist view of the law. 
Dominance feminism facilitated the enactment of mandatory policies 
by suggesting that by virtue of their subordinated status, women 
were incapable of making rational choices in the face of abuse and in-
stead were in need of the substituted judgment of the legal system.254
Such policies fail to acknowledge that women can be battered and 
nonetheless be actors with the ability to determine the course of their 
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lives.255 Dominance feminism provided an ideological justification for 
domestic violence policies that stereotyped all women who had been 
battered as a particular type of victim, denied them agency, and dic-
tated what their response to the violence should be.256
 Critics of dominance feminism have given it a different label: vic-
tim feminism.257 Dominance feminism rests upon the idea that every 
woman is a victim or a potential victim of male subordination, acted 
upon rather than acting.258 That perspective has been challenged by a 
new wave of feminist theorists who argue that the experiences of in-
dividual women, rather than a stereotyped “universal” woman or vic-
tim, must be at the center of feminist theorizing and policymaking.259
Anti-essentialist feminists argue that there is no unitary women’s 
experience; the experiences of black women may be vastly different 
than those of white women, for example, or those of poor women dis-
tinct from those with greater means.260
 The attempt to shoehorn all women’s experiences into that of the 
über-woman, anti-essentialist feminists contend, has privileged the 
experiences of white, middle class, straight women over those of oth-
ers.261 Anti-essentialists argue that we must instead see women at 
the intersections of the various identities that construct them: race, 
sexual orientation, class, disability, and any other characteristic that 
shapes the woman.262 Only then can policies be responsive to the 
needs of all women. While some have argued that third-wave femin-
ism is pre-legal,263 anti-essentialism may, in fact, be the legal manife-
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station of third-wave feminism, embracing third-wave feminism’s re-
jection of early versions of feminist theory and focusing on the “mul-
tiple nature of personal identity.”264
 Mandatory policies in cases involving domestic violence are incon-
sistent with anti-essentialist feminism. Mandatory policies assume 
that all women who have been battered are “victims,” stereotyping 
them as meek, afraid, and easily manipulated and controlled, rather 
than seeing the complexity of and differences among them.265 These 
policies deny women the ability to define themselves, distilling every 
woman down to the stereotypical victim in need of the system’s pro-
tection, unable to make rational choices. Mandatory policies ignore 
that women experiencing violence may have multiple goals, assum-
ing instead that all women prioritize safety and accountability.  
 Defining all women as victims allowed the legal system to narrow 
the available options, depriving women who had been battered of the 
ability to pursue possibilities beyond the range of those deemed ac-
ceptable by the legal system. Anti-essentialist feminism requires that 
women who have been battered be treated as individuals with differ-
ent identities and capacities, and that they be given the opportunity 
to make choices consistent with their own goals and priorities. In a 
third-wave feminist world, women who have been battered should 
not be told by the state that they have no choice about arrest, prose-
cution, or mediation.266 Instead, domestic violence law and policy 
should respect the rights of individual women to choose whether and 
how to use the criminal and civil legal systems.267 Such a shift would 
be consistent both with anti-essentialist feminist theory and with the 
focus on autonomy and agency that characterized the early battered 
women’s movement. 
 Critics of anti-essentialist feminism have argued that its focus on 
the individual creates a fragmentation of interests that can render 
policymaking impossible.268 But focusing on an individual’s autono-
my—her right to make her own decisions—creates a clear path for 
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policymakers. Domestic violence law and policy should not act on in-
dividuals, but rather should be available to be deployed by them as 
they see fit. Domestic violence law and policy need not address each 
individual’s personal concerns; it need only give her the ability to 
choose whether, when, and how to utilize tools like arrest, prosecu-
tion, and mediation. Creating space for choice honors the differences 
between women, recognizing that race, class, sexual orientation, dis-
ability status, and a multiplicity of other variables color how a par-
ticular woman might want to respond to a particular incidence of vi-
olence at a particular moment in time. Enabling women who have 
been battered to decide how they will engage with the legal system 
respects their autonomy and agency and allows individual women to 
craft the solutions that they perceive are most likely to meet their 
goals, whether those goals are safety, accountability, economic stabil-
ity, or maintenance of their intimate relationships. 
 The choices made by women who have been battered will certainly 
have consequences, sometimes overwhelmingly negative conse-
quences.269 Some women who choose not to have their partners ar-
rested will be battered again; some will die.270 Some offenders will be 
free to abuse again as a result of dismissed prosecutions. Some wom-
en will strike bad deals in mediation or experience revictimization in 
the process. Creating space for individuals to exercise their ability to 
choose, regardless of the outcomes of those choices, is a hallmark of 
autonomy. But many other women will be empowered by the ability 
to make these choices for themselves in the contexts of their own 
lives, rather than having the legal system impose decisions upon 
them based on what they “should” want. If empowerment is still the 
goal of the battered women’s movement, we must accept that women 
who have been battered have the right to make choices that we might 
disagree with, dislike, or fear.271
 Although many of the advocates who originally endorsed them 
have come to question mandatory policies,272 that reevaluation may 
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have come too late. The state, which has embraced these mandatory 
policies, has very different goals for its interventions than advocates 
do. The state has put substantial resources behind policies like man-
datory arrest and no-drop prosecution,273 and an entire generation of 
police and prosecutors has been schooled in both the theory underly-
ing these policies and the techniques for instituting them.274 Similar-
ly, mediation bans are enshrined in state law and policy.275 Mediators 
and judges are trained to screen domestic violence cases out of medi-
ation,276 and advocates hold tight to their belief that mediation is 
harmful for all women who have been battered.277
 Mandatory interventions, particularly in the criminal justice sys-
tem, are the rule, not the exception, and new mandatory interven-
tions are being proposed to address perceived shortcomings in the 
system.278 Changing the legal system’s culture to foster autonomy for 
women who have been battered will be significantly more difficult 
than getting the legal system to embrace those changes in the first 
instance. The experience with mandatory policies should serve as a 
cautionary tale, though, prompting advocates and policy makers to 
think carefully before enacting laws and policies that bind all women 
who have been battered, notwithstanding those women’s own goals, 
beliefs, choices, and situations. Mandatory interventions in cases in-
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volving domestic violence are a second-wave relic that feminists 
should shed as we move into a third-wave world. 
VII.   CONCLUSION
 Barbara Hart has argued that 
Agency is the power to make informed decisions and implement 
them without interference by the batterer. Agency is the power to 
organize one’s life. Agency is the power to establish stable, nurtur-
ing homes for children. Agency is the power to participate, without 
batterer impediment, in work, education, faith, family and com-
munity . . . . Agency is the power to employ the legal options, com-
munity resources, economic remedies, housing opportunities, and 
educational programs available in order to escape the violence and 
achieve lives that are free of intimidation, degradation, and viola-
tion.279
But agency is also the power to choose not to have an intimate part-
ner arrested. Agency is the power to choose not to participate in a 
prosecution that could cause an intimate partner to go to jail or be 
deported or simply be removed from the family. Agency is the power 
to confront an intimate partner with his violence and advocate on 
one’s own behalf for a mediated settlement to pending litigation. 
Agency is the power to see a physician to have injuries treated but 
choose to have that physician maintain confidentiality about the 
cause of those injuries. Agency is self-direction, self-determination, 
and the ability to identify, evaluate, and make decisions. Agency and 
autonomy are what women who have been battered are denied by 
mandatory policies in cases involving domestic violence. Anti-
essentialist feminist policymaking should turn away from the man-
datory policies of the past and embrace policies that empower women 
who want to be seen as individuals, agents, and actors—not as vic-
tims. A third-wave feminist vision of the world demands no less.  
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